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I. SUMMER HEAT
It is summer, and it is sizzling hot! The stories about Debrahlee Lorenzana’s
claims regarding being fired by Citibank are rampant. It is the summer’s hottest story
about “getting hot” over being fired for “being hot”! One might surmise that the pivotal
word here is “hot.”1
*

© 2010 Frank L. Maraist Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center of Louisiana State University. I
thank Professor Michael J. Zimmer for reading and commenting on a draft. I am grateful for a summer
research grant from the Law Center.
1
“Hot” is a word that has multiple meanings, and it is one of the hottest words in the vernacular. One
obvious meaning is ‘having a relatively high temperature.” See http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/hot. As used in the “too hot to work” stories, a slang meaning of the word is
“sexually excited or exciting.” See http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hot. Also relevant is an informal

1

During summer it’s normally like a sauna in south Louisiana where I live,2 but
this summer the most sensational story on the Internet and in print3 is a steamy one, and it
is making me more anxious than ever for fall (semester). I admit that the story has me
very excited—about employment discrimination and employment law.
A few years ago I predicted that appearance-based discrimination never will be
covered by federal employment discrimination law or by many state or local employment
discrimination laws.4 Nonetheless, I posited that appearance discrimination provides a
mirror for reflecting on some of the most difficult and intriguing issues in employment
discrimination law and thereby developing an appreciation for the complexities and
nuances of that body of law.5 I also argued that appearance discrimination provides a
gauge for understanding the limitations of discrimination law.6 Accordingly, I always
begin my employment discrimination course by raising questions about appearance-based

meaning—“currently very popular.” Id. One additional definition is implicated: “quickly angered: easily
provoked or aroused” Id.
2
Virtually all the stories about Ms. Lorenzana’s case use the terminology “too hot” and “steamy.” The
sex/weather double entendre is common. The 1981 movie Body Heat used the steamy settings of south
Florida and the boiling passion of characters played by William Hurt and Kathleen Turner very
evocatively. See BODY HEAT (Warner Bros. 1981).
3
The article breaking the story apparently was Elizabeth Dwoskin, Is This Woman Too Hot to be a Banker?
THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 1, 2010, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/2010-06-01/news/is-thiswoman-too-hot-to-work-in-a-bank/ From that point the story caught fire. See Jen Doll & Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Debrahlee Lorenzana Story Goes Global, Viral, Crazy, THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 7, 2010,
available at http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/2010/06/debrahlee_loren_1.php. As one
story put it, when you achieve your own Wikipedia listing, you have arrived. Id. (citing
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debrahlee_Lorenzana); see also Susan Antilla, “Too Hot” Banker Lawsuit
Misses Real Issues, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Business Day (June 8, 2010), available at
http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/too-hot-banker-lawsuit-misses-real-issues-20100608xtdn.html (stating “[i]n case aliens sequestered you in a spaceship for the past week,” and summarizing
story). Ms. Lorenzana appeared on both Today and Good Morning America less than a week after The
Village Voice published the story. Id. As has been pointed out, the photos of Ms. Lorenzana
accompanying the first story probably helped attract attention to the story. Id.
4
William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of Our
Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153 (2007).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 160-62.
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discrimination as a way of introducing many of the issues that we will discuss in the
course.
Developments this summer demonstrate that I am not alone in my interest in the
topic of appearance discrimination: about the time that the Lorenzana story was
spreading like wildfire, Stanford Law School Professor Deborah Rhode’s book about
American society’s obsession with physical beauty and the phenomenon of appearancebased discrimination was published.7 With a sizzling summer story that went “global,
viral, crazy”8 and a book on the topic by one of academia’s most prolific scholars,9
appearance-based discrimination is the torrid topic in employment discrimination law.
The hottest topic of the summer should make my August classes more enthralling and
heat them up through the cool breezes of October and the frosts of December.
Enough heat? Okay, let’s cool this down.
II. THE HOTTEST LAW OF ALL: MEDIA BLITZ AND TEACHABLE MOMENTS

7

DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW (Oxford Univ.
Press 2010); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (2009). In
addition to Rhode’s work, other recent scholarly commentary has considered appearance discrimination.
See, e.g., Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2000); James Desir, Note, Lookism: Pushing the Frontier of Equality by Looking Beyond the
Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 629; Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring
Decisions: How Federal Law Should Be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the
Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431 (2005); Stacey S. Baron, Note, (Un)lawfully Beautiful: The
Legal (De)construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2005).
8
See Doll & Dwoskin, supra note __ (reporting that in less than a week after the story broke in The Village
Voice, it had been covered in Mexico, India, Colombia, Ireland, Canada, and the United Kingdom); see
also David Weidner, “Too Hot” for this Column: Commentary: Debrahlee Lorenzana is the Talk of Wall
Street—Why? MarketWatch, June 15, 2010, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-bankertoo-hot-for-wall-street-2010-06-15?dist=beforebell (“For all of the attention Lorenzana claims to have
received at work, it doesn't compare to the stalking by the media. First, the Village Voice, then the New
York Post, The CBS Early Show, NBC's Today Show, ABC's Good Morning America and The New York
Daily News . . . .”).
9
Rhode’s book immediately attracted attention. See Emily Bazelon, Just One Look, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday
Book Review (May 13, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/books/review/Bazelont.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Our Beauty Bias Is Unfair: But Should It Also Be Illegal?, NEWSWEEK (June 4,
2010), available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/04/our-beauty-bias-is-unfair.html.

3

Lawyers of all types, and perhaps particularly law professors, think that the
subject matter that is our stock in trade is inherently interesting. I think the general
public often finds the law less interesting than we lawyers do—at least many of the
aspects of it in which we immerse ourselves.10 On the first day of my employment
discrimination class, I always tell my students that they have chosen a good course
because we will be addressing some of the most interesting and difficult issues that a
society faces, and that much is at stake in a society’s resolution of those issues. Beyond
salesmanship, I believe what I tell them. I proudly proclaim that we will deal with
controversial issues such as affirmative action, reverse discrimination, appearance
discrimination, and sexual harassment. From there we plunge into the exhilarating pool
of material on proof structures developed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v.
Green11 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins12 to evaluate disparate treatment employment
discrimination claims. Although I think these proof structures are about the most
titillating things in the world, I don’t think my students wake up again until we get to
sexual harassment—many weeks after we slug through the morass that the proof
structures have become.13

10

I realize that this statement is debatable. For example, there are legal issues that get people terribly
excited, such as abortion, affirmative action, bearing arms, etc. Furthermore, lawyers have been the subject
of numerous books, television shows and movies. However, people often engage the legal issues that
interest them on an emotional level. How many people who get hot and bothered about affirmative action
understand the legal analysis under the fourteenth amendment or Title VII? Moreover, the television shows
and movies often focus on the action-filled, dramatic lives of the lawyers—lives very different from those
of most lawyers I know. Consider, for example, the television series L.A. Law, The Practice, and Boston
Legal. See generally PRIME TIME LAW (Robert M. Jarvis & Paul R Joseph eds. 1998).
11
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
12
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
13
Professor Martin Katz labeled the current state regarding the disparate treatment proof structures “a
quagmire.” See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2008). See
also Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment
Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83 (2004); Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is
Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004) Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort;
Vie le Roi!” An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title

4

Many have decried the handling of Ms. Lorenzana’s story and claim14-- what with
the slideshow of her photos that accompanies the stories.15 As one commentator put it,
for example, “Gender discrimination and sexual harassment are serious workplace issues
— and in our opinion, Ms. Lorenzana’s tale does female employees no service.”16
However, the purpose of this essay is neither to determine the veracity of Ms.
Lorenzana’s allegations nor to judge the manner in which she or her attorney or anyone
else involved is handling her story and claim. Juxtaposed with Professor Rhode’s book,
this sensational story about what is essentially appearance-based discrimination17
provides an opportunity to ponder (and teach) about a number of significant employment
discrimination issues. It is important to seize the day, as media blitzes only occasionally
create such teachable moments.
III. THE HOT STORY AND THE HOT BOOK OF THE SIZZLING SUMMER OF 2010
Ms. Lorenzana filed a lawsuit in November 2009, alleging that she was fired by
Citibank in violation of employment discrimination laws.18 The claimant is a 33-year old
woman and a single mother. She often is described as very physically attractive—more
precisely the stories describe her as “hot!” She came to New York from Puerto Rico at
age 21.19 She quit a job in 2003 as a sales representative, and in her resignation letter she

VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003);
William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005).
14
See Antilla, supra note __.
15
Ms. Lorenzana’s first attorney arranged the photo shoot, filed the complaint, and represented her for a
while, but he was replaced within three weeks of the story breaking. See Edecio Martinez, Debrahlee
Lorenzana: “Too Sexy for Citibank” Hires Celebrity Lawyer Gloria Allred, cbsnews.com, June 15, 2010,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20007652-504083.html.
16
See Tim Gould, Too Sexy for Work: Would That Be an ADA Issue? HR MORNING, June 3, 2010,
available at http://www.hrmorning.com/too-sexy-for-work-would-that-be-an-ada-issue/.
17
Of course, because appearance is not a covered characteristic under the applicable laws, she pled sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation. See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.
18
See Complaint, Lorenzana v. CitiGroup Inc., No. 116382/09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Nov. 20, 2009), court
documents available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/SQLData.jsp?IndexNo=116382-2009.
19
Dwoskin, supra note ___.

5

cited the hostile work environment that she said developed after she reported sexual
harassment. She was hired by Citibank as a business banker in 2008. She says that soon
after she was hired, she was told by a colleague that the bank branch was known for
hiring “pretty girls.” Lorenzana alleges that her two male supervisors began making
comments to her about her dress and appearance.20 She says they told her not to wear
certain types of clothes, types that are not particularly revealing or provocative, but she
alleges that she was told that on her they were too provocative and that she distracted her
male colleagues. In short, she says she was told to wear looser fitting clothing.21 She did
not comply with their directives because she could not afford a new wardrobe, and she
claims that it is part of her Latin (Puerto Rican) culture that women spend time and effort
on their feminine appearance for work. She alleges that she was not provided with
adequate training for her job, and that she was sent out to bring in business, which then
was assigned to her male colleagues. Lorenzana alleges that she complained to the
human resources department about the comments of her supervisors regarding her
clothing and about two male supervisors meeting with her without another woman
present. She claims that she was placed on probation allegedly because of inadequate

20
21

See Complaint in Lorenzana v. Citigroup Inc., supra note __.
See id. The complaint states as follows:
Plaintiff opposed these unlawful workplace practices and complained to
management, pointing out that other female colleagues wore similar professional attire.
In a regressive response more suitable for reality television than a white-shoe
corporation in the twenty-first century, Plaintiff was advised that told that these other
comparator females may wear what they like, as they general unattractiveness
rendered moot their sartorial choices, unlike Plaintiff, whose shapeliness could not be
heightened by beautifully tailored clothing. Plaintiff experienced these distressing
comments as sexist, objectifying, humiliating and discriminatory.

Id. ¶ 7.

6

sales credits. She alleges that the letter notifying her of her probation mentioned that she
was late for work on two days, but this reason obviously was fabricated because on those
two days the branch office was closed. She sent a long email to two regional vice
presidents in which she complained about the hostile work environment. Although the
vice presidents never responded, she eventually was transferred to another branch, where
she alleges that she was not permitted to do the work for which she was hired. The
manager of the branch eventually fired her, mentioning her dress issues at the first branch
and saying that she did not fit the culture of Citibank. Ms. Lorenzana filed a lawsuit
against Citibank, stating claims under New York City law for sex discrimination in
termination, hostile work environment sexual harassment, and retaliation for opposing or
complaining of sex discrimination.22 Because she signed a mandatory arbitration
agreement, the lawsuit was dismissed, and the claim was submitted to arbitration.23
Ms. Lorenzana subsequently was hired by JPMorgan Chase. Her story hit the
stands, the Internet, and the airwaves at the beginning of June 2010. Her new employer
apparently was less than pleased with the attention that she was attracting. Ms.
22

Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 28-29 & 31-32.
See Defendant Citigroup Inc.’s Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration and/or Stay the Proceedings,
available at court documents supra note __. The enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements with
respect to statutory employment discrimination claims is a significant hot issue. See, e.g., Michael Z.
Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment
Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58 (2007). A bill introduced in Congress, the Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2009, would invalidate pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements in employment, consumer, and
franchise agreements unless provided for in collective bargaining agreements. See S. 931, 111th Cong.
(2009); Bill Introduced in Senate Would Bar Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Claims, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 85, at A-9 (May 6, 2009). That topic is beyond the scope of this Essay, but one point
seems pertinent here. One of the policy arguments against mandatory arbitration of employment
discrimination claims is that the public needs to be made aware of the adjudication and resolution of these
claims involving the important public policy of antidiscrimination. See, e.g., EEOC Notice No. 915.002,
Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a
Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997). Although Ms. Lorenzana’s claims have been submitted to
arbitration, the public is keenly aware of her story and her claims. I do not suggest that this undermines the
argument against mandatory private arbitration of discrimination claims, but it does seem to demonstrate
that in the current and evolving state of media and information and communication technology, a
captivating story will come to the public’s attention. It should come as a surprise to no one that sex and
sexiness arouse public interest.
23
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Lorenzana claims that her new employer ordered her to stop speaking to the media about
her claim against Citibank and threatened to fire her if she did not desist.24 According to
her, a manager told her that she was violating a written code of conduct that prohibits
employees from criticizing the financial industry.25
Soon after the story lit up cyberspace and the airwaves, a 2003 video clip
featuring Lorenzana surfaced. The video, Plastic Surgery: Transforming Lives, featured
Lorenzana discussing her breast augmentation surgeries and saying, among other things,
that she wants to look like a “Playboy playmate.”26 The story provoked a sensational and
scathing backlash.27 Then, Lorenzana changed attorneys, hiring a high-profile attorney
who has represented a number of “celebrity” women.28 Her new attorney immediately
launched a counteroffensive against the negative stories.29
Professor Rhode’s book hit the stands about the time the Lorenzana story was
breaking. In The Beauty Bias, Rhode, one of academia’s most productive scholars,
provides a careful study of the current phenomenon of appearance-based discrimination
and puts it in cultural and historical perspectives, finding that appearance bias is not new,
although it has been whipped to a fever pitch by contemporary market forces, technology,
24

Elizabeth Dwoskin, Debrahlee Lorenzana Now Also Too Hot for JP Morgan Chase, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, June 6, 2010, available at
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/archives/2010/06/debrahlee_loren.php.
25
Id.
26
See Helena Andrews, Debrahlee Lorenzana: A Double Take on Those Double D’s, politicssdaily.com,
available at http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/06/11/debrahlee-lorenzana-a-double-take-on-those-doubleds/.
27
See Andrea Peyser, Call Off the Bod-Squad—This Boob Has Been Exposed, NYPost.com, June 24, 2010,
available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/call_off_the_bod_squad_this_boob_ETk59Mw6O7C2cMTOdVJIgL
(with video).
28
See, e.g., Martinez, supra note __; Romy Ribitzky, Allred to the Rescue, Portfolio.com, June 15, 2010,
available at http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/daily-brief/2010/06/15/bank-babe-debrahlee-lorenzanahires-feminist-lawyer-gloria-allred?ana=from_rss.
29
See Woman Fired for Being Too Hot Says Her Boob Job Not a License to Stare!, Radaronline.com, June
15, 2010, available at http://www.radaronline.com/exclusives/2010/06/exclusive-woman-fired-being-toohot-says-her-boob-job-not-license-stare.

8

and media.30 She surveys the body of existing employment discrimination law and
challenges the assertion of other commentators that appearance cannot or should not be
added as a covered characteristic.31 Finally, Professor Rhode considers strategies for
changing the culture of appearance discrimination other than legal prohibitions.32
IV. HOT LESSONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
In this part, I consider several salient employment discrimination issues raised by
appearance discrimination, some of them highlighted in Professor Rhode’s book and/or
Ms. Lorenzana’s claims. First, physical appearance, although it probably is one of the
most commonly practiced types of employment discrimination,33 generally is not covered
by employment discrimination laws, and I have predicted (and continue to predict) that it
never will be. Nevertheless, numerous claims that essentially allege appearance
discrimination have been fit under characteristics that are covered by existing law. The
potentially uncovered claims that can be made barely covered claims should raise some
questions about the “slippery” nature of our employment discrimination law. Second,
reverse discrimination claims challenge some of the basic principles of our employment
discrimination law. When a woman sues claiming that she was discriminated against
because she is “too hot” or too attractive, we should consider whether Caucasians should
be able successfully to sue for race discrimination, Christians for religious discrimination,
young people for age discrimination, and so on. Third, what are the limits of the concept
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), whereby employers are permitted to
discriminate based on protected characteristics if they can demonstrate that being male,

30

RHODE, supra note __, at 49-68.
Id. at 101-116
32
Id. ch. 7.
33
Id. at 2 & ch. 2.

31

9

being younger, etc. is essential to the job? BFOQ is a statutorily recognized defense to
discrimination based on a few covered characteristics, and the appropriate breadth or
narrowness of the defense is a controversial and persistent topic. Appearance provides an
effective mirror for reflecting on this topic because appearance can fall somewhere along
a continuum of relevant to essential for many jobs. Fourth, retaliation is the most
potent/dangerous claim under employment discrimination laws, and retaliation can
provide some measure of protection for appearance-based discrimination. Fifth, the
Lorenzana case raises questions about the appropriate role in an employment
discrimination case, particularly a sex discrimination case, of evidence of the alleged
victim’s dress or peripheral conduct, such as the 2003 video of Ms. Lorenzana. Finally,
the overarching issue for appearance-based discrimination is the current predominance of
employment at will in this nation, whereby employers generally can fire employees for
any reason, good or bad, as long as the reason does not fall under the exceptions carved
out by statute or case law. If 49 states in the United States followed the lead of Montana
and abrogated employment at will, employers would be able to fire legally only if they
had good cause, and that would obviate our asking whether appearance should be covered
under employment discrimination laws. In sum, in thinking about appearance
discrimination, we can gain insight into several of the most significant and controversial
issues in employment discrimination law and perhaps a better understanding of the
complexities and nuances of this body of law. Thus, even if I am correct that appearance
never will be generally covered by employment discrimination laws in the United States,
delving into the topic nonetheless offers the opportunity to improve our existing law.

10

A. Appearance-Based Discrimination—Coverage, Noncoverage, and How to Fit a Claim
Under Existing Employment Discrimination Laws
1. Why Appearance-Based Discrimination Never Will Be Generally
Covered (But I Could Be Wrong)
The United States has no federal employment discrimination laws that prohibit
discrimination based on physical appearance,34 unless the particular aspect of appearance
constitutes a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.35 One state
and the District of Columbia have laws that prohibit at least some types of appearancebased discrimination.36 There also are a handful of city and county ordinances that
prohibit appearance-based discrimination.37 Although the United States often lags behind
other nations in protective employment laws,38 the absence of appearance discrimination
protection is not an example of “American exceptionalism.”39

34

See, e.g., Corbett, supra note __, at 155.
Obesity is one of the most commonly discussed appearance claims under the ADA. See, e.g., RHODE,
supra note ___, at 122-25; Jane Korn, Too Fat, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 209 (2010); Corbett, supra note
___ at 164 (discussing Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc., No. 04-CV-3471, 2005 WL 241180,
16 A.D. Cas. 732 (D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2005)). There have been a few other disability discrimination cases that
might be characterized as appearance discrimination cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Chamber of
Commerce Pub., Inc., 108 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1997) (man missing 18 teeth stated viable claim for disability
discrimination under “regarded as” definition of disability).
36
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1401.02 (22) & 2-1402.11 (2001) (personal appearance); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
37.2202 (West 2001) (height and weight). See generally RHODE, supra note __, at 126-134 (surveying
state and local laws).
37
CODE OF ORDINANCES CITY OF URBANA, ILL. §§12-37 & 12-62 (personal appearance); CITY OF
MADISON, WIS. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 3.23 (2)(bb) (physical appearance); SANTA CRUZ, CAL. MUN.
CODE §§ 9.83.010 & 9.83.020 (13) (physical characteristic)
38
See Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Ordering at Century’s End: Reflections on
Emerging Trends in the United States, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 103-04 (1999) (AAs is generally known, the
United States historically has provided comparatively meager formal legal protections of the employment
relationship. Foreign observers typically characterize us as a >hire and fire= society, . . .@).
39
No other nation has such national law. See RHODE, supra note __, at 134-35. Regarding American
exceptionalism generally, see Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1479, 1480 (2003) (“Since September 11, “American Exceptionalism” has emerged as a dominant
leitmotif in today’s headlines.”).
35
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Most people probably believe that discrimination based on physical appearance is
commonplace in employment and in most facets of life.40 Furthermore, attention to
appearance and appearance discrimination seem to be more significant issues for women
than for men.41 Indeed, contemporary society seems to be utterly and completely
obsessed with physical attractiveness—particularly that of women.42 My guess it that
many also believe that such discrimination is morally wrong or at least unfair.43
Furthermore, many people probably erroneously believe that an employer cannot legally
fire someone based on their physical attractiveness or lack thereof.44 So, why don’t we
have a federal law and laws in many or most states that prohibit appearance-based
discrimination? We do not have many such statutes, and we never will. There may be
many reasons, but I will address two.45
a. The Coverage Problem: “I’m Ugly, and Even if I’m Not, They
Think I am.”
The most significant reason is that the protected characteristic could be so
amorphous that analysis of claims would focus on the initial issue of who possessed the
covered characteristic. On this point, appearance would present more difficulties than
any characteristic that currently is covered by the federal employment discrimination
laws. As a preliminary matter, what would the statute say? As Rhode explains,
appearance bias falls along a continuum.46 Would the law list specific aspects of

40

See Corbett, supra note ___, at 157.
RHODE, supra note __, at xv & 30-32.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 173.
44
Many people in the U.S. do not seem to appreciate the meaning of employment at will, which is the law
in 49 states. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, And Why
Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 (2002). Employment at will is discussed further in Part IV.F infra.
45
For further discussion of reasons, see Corbett, supra note ___.
46
RHODE, supra note __, at 25
41
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appearance such as height, weight, facial characteristics, body shape, dress, and
grooming?47 If the statute included such a list of specific covered characteristics,
determining coverage might not be so difficult, but would the list be underinclusive,
failing to capture much of the type of discrimination with which we are concerned?48 If a
plaintiff sued for weight discrimination, could an employer escape liability by claiming it
discriminated based on general appearance rather than weight?
If the statute were drafted to eschew specifics and instead covered the general
characteristic of “appearance,” that is, attractiveness or unattractiveness, how does one
decide whether a claimant is unattractive (or attractive) enough to make a claim for such
discrimination.49 As one commentator expressed this idea: “Will there be a national
standard of attractiveness established by EEOC rulemaking?”50 Compare this coverage
issue with that under the American with Disabilities Act, which covers the amorphous
characteristic of “disability.”51 Much of the litigation under the ADA focuses on whether
one has a disability that substantially limits a major life activity, and plaintiffs have lost a
stunning percentage of ADA cases because of failure to satisfy the definition.52 Similar
difficulties arise with religion under Title VII. What constitutes religious beliefs? While
there are mainline religious groups and traditional beliefs and practices that clearly fall

47

Id.
This issue arose regarding the definition of “disability” in the discussions and negotiations leading up to
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(2008).
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See, e.g., Selmi, supra note___ at 533 (“[T]he need to define the protected class renders disability
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See, e.g., Sandra B. Reiss & J. Trent Scofield, The New and Expanded Americans With Disabilities Act,
70 ALA. LAW. 38, 39 (2009); Corbett, supra note __, at 173-74.
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under the protected characteristic,53 much as there are disabilities that unquestionably are
covered by the ADA, the EEOC adopted a very broad definition of religion in the
regulation it promulgated: “moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which
are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views.”54 Is a belief that a
person’s eating a particular brand of cat food is necessary for good health a covered
religious belief?55 Similar difficulties and uncertainties regarding coverage would pertain
to physical appearance. As the old adage goes, “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.”
Moreover, it seems likely that the stigma attached to being considered unattractive, much
less publicly proclaiming oneself to be so, would dissuade victims from asserting
claims.56 One can imagine a colloquy between a judge and a plaintiff at a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment or at trial:
Judge: You say your employer discriminated against you because of your
appearance. What do you mean?
Plaintiff: I mean because I am ugly, You Honor.
Judge: Well, you are not the most attractive person I have ever seen, but I
have seen worse. Take my clerk, for example. I doubt your employer
discriminated against you because you are ugly because you are not all
that ugly.
Plaintiff’s Counsel: With all due respect, Your Honor, my client is
hideous. To wit, res ipsa loquitur.

53

See 29 C.F.R. 1605.1 (1980) ( “In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is
not at issue.”).
54
Id.
55
See Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding
it is not).
56
See RHODE, supra note ___, at 111-112.

14

I suppose the concern with stigma and resulting plaintiff reluctance does not apply
to reverse appearance discrimination cases, like that of Ms. Lorenzana. Plaintiffs may be
more willing to claim that they were victimized because of their beauty or hotness.
However, there may be some risk that gives plaintiffs pause--the fact finder may disagree
with the plaintiff’s assertion that she is hot.
The hypothetical colloquy above suggests that the coverage issue actually is more
complicated than I have depicted so far. The elusive fact of beauty, hotness, or ugliness
is not the dispositive issue on coverage. The linchpin for coverage would be how one
was regarded by the discriminators. That is, the dispositive question actually is not
whether one is pretty or ugly, but whether one was so regarded by the discriminators.57
This differs somewhat from other protected characteristics. For example, with race and
sex, these are matters of fact that usually are readily observable by potential
discriminators. When a Caucasian employee sues for race discrimination, we waste little
time in litigation trying to determine whether the plaintiff is in fact Caucasian and
whether the alleged discriminators regarded her as such. This is not always true of all
covered characteristics. While national origin is a factual matter, it is not always known
or observable. For example, people sometimes harass a person because of what they
erroneously think her national origin to be.58 This was such a significant concern under
the ADA, that Congress drafted a three-pronged definition of “disability,” one of which is
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A similar but not identical aspect of appearance that is different from some other characteristics covered
under current law is that the appearance characteristic usually is not absolute, but relative. One is male or
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comparatively. The relative nature of a covered characteristic was recognized by Congress in the ADA.
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See, e.g., EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 469 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (although plaintiff was Indian,
coemployees harassed him and made statements about plaintiff being Arab and Muslim).
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“being regarded as having an impairment.”59

With appearance, meaning physical

attractiveness or unattractiveness, the fact is so subjective that every case actually is
about how one was regarded by the alleged discriminators. There may be cases of res
ipsa loquitur, but most will depend upon proof of how the plaintiff was regarded. Even
disability is more concrete, with numerous impairments that clearly satisfy the definition.
b. Fighting Against Nature: People Are Hard-Wired to Be
Attracted to Beauty
A second reason that appearance-based discrimination never will be covered is
that it seems very likely that we cannot significantly reduce this type of discrimination
through law,60 and it is far from clear that we want to do it anyway. People are attracted
to those who are physically attractive. Contemporary American society celebrates and
embraces physical beauty with an inexhaustible fervor. In a visual age of computers,
Internet, and three-dimensional images, we display beauty everywhere.61

However,

American culture is not deviant in the world today in rhapsodizing about beauty, and this
is not the first decade or century in which beautiful people have been placed on a
pedestal.62

One of the concerns many commentators have with our employment

discrimination law is that we focus on intentional discrimination and require plaintiffs to
prove the motive of the discriminator at the time of the discriminatory act, while there is
evidence that the way in which discrimination occurs in the brain is largely subliminal
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Although Professor Rhode disagrees with this point, she discusses the argument: “To some courts and
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and unconscious.63 Thus, there is a disconnect between the analyses we use to prove
discrimination and the way the actual phenomenon occurs.

With appearance-based

discrimination, this disconnect may be exacerbated because we may be confronting one
of the most hard-wired of all types of discrimination.64 Studies indicate that babies
shown images of faces favor the attractive faces.65 Although we often repeat the adage
that “beauty is only skin deep,” it is questionable whether we have either the same moral
conviction about that type of discrimination that we do about racial, sexual, and national
origin discrimination or the ability to regulate and deter it through law. Preference for
beauty is old, deeply ingrained, and probably hard to extirpate.66
c. Prognosticating and Disclaiming
Considering the difficulty of writing a law with an appropriate balance between
specificity and breadth of coverage, identifying those who are covered by the law, and the
unlikelihood of significantly displacing the beauty bias, I reiterate my prediction that
there will be no federal employment discrimination law prohibiting appearance-based
discrimination and few state and local laws. However, as a prognosticator on
developments in the law with a less than unblemished record, I wish to add that I could
be wrong. How does a characteristic come to be covered by federal, state, or local
employment discrimination laws? I listed five factors in my prior article: 1) moral
objection to the type of discrimination; 2) cohesive and identifiable group; 3) history of
discrimination on that basis; 4) immutability of the characteristic; and 5) irrelevance of
63

See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995): Ann C. McGinley,
Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443 (2010).
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See RHODE, supra note ___, at 45-46.
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Id. at 26.
66
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the characteristic to work.67 Also, there must be sufficient political backing to achieve
passage of the law, which often requires supporters to engage in activism and build
coalitions with advocates of other interests.68 In light of the Lorenzana claim and
publicity and the publication of Professor Rhode’s book, it is worth noting that
captivating stories and scholarship69 can help move the law in directions that it otherwise
may not have moved.
Stories that capture the public’s attention can find their way into legislative
chambers. When the stories are supported by scholarship, the chances for passage of the
laws sometimes increase. Consider, for example, the case of genetic discrimination. The
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) was signed into law by President
Bush on May 21, 2008.70 By the time GINA became a federal employment
discrimination law, it had been introduced in Congress several times, and a majority of
the states had amended their state laws to include genetic information discrimination.71
Considering the five factors listed above,72 the case for the genetic discrimination law
was far less compelling than was the case for race, sex, age, or any other characteristic
covered by the federal employment discrimination laws. Particularly lacking is a wellchronicled history of discrimination based on genetic information.73 No other
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See Corbett, supra note __, at 171-77.
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Perhaps relevant here is the argument by Professor Anita Bernstein that one key to adoption of new torts
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discrimination statute has been enacted without a substantial history of discrimination.
There were a few stories of such discrimination,74 and the EEOC suit against Burlington
Northern Railroad was a headline grabber.75 In addition to the big story, there was a
large and growing body of scholarship advocating passage of a genetic discrimination
law.76 And in 2009, genetic information joined the list of protected characteristics in
federal employment discrimination law.
There are other examples of laws aided by stories and scholarship. Sexual
harassment (hostile environment) was recognized as a type of sex discrimination
supported by many cases and stories of sexual harassment and the influential scholarship
of Professor Catherine McKinnon.77 The recognition in most states of the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy owes much to an article written by
Professor Lawrence Blades78 and stories of some abusive terminations of employees.
Although I always have doubted its prospects for success, anti-bullying legislation is
being considered in several state legislatures, aided by stories and scholarship.79

existing genetic-information discrimination as evidence that the law was premature or
unnecessary. Its proponents, however, presented GINA as a unique opportunity to stop
discrimination before it starts. It is this preemptive nature, basing protection on future-rather than past or even present--discrimination, that truly makes GINA novel.
74
See id. at 466-68.
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So, it is possible that stories of appearance-based discrimination and scholarship,
such as Professor Rhode’s book, may bolster the prospects and spur the adoption of more
state and possibly even federal law prohibiting appearance-based discrimination.
However, with respect to the effect of scholarship, Professor Anita Bernstein has argued
that although new torts have been aided by scholars, the courts are receptive when a tort,
although advocated by a scholar, is made to appear “independent of individual human
creation.”80 It is difficult to predict the effect of Rhode’s book. With regard to stories, it
also is difficult to gauge the effect of the Lorenzana story. A well-publicized story about
a woman who says she was fired because of her appearance could bolster prospects for
passage of an appearance discrimination law. However, one readily can see how this
story may have the opposite effect. Were Lorenzana an appearance-challenged (ugly)
person suing for an unfair termination, she would be likely to evoke sympathy, but
ironically not nearly as much publicity. It is far from clear that legislators or judges will
be moved by a claim that is characterized as “Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful”—the
infamous line from a 1980s shampoo commercial.81 I don’t want to appear naïve in
underestimating the beauty bias, however; it is true that attractive people sometimes
evoke sympathy, admiration, forgiveness, or other milk of human kindness in situations
in which unattractive people do not. Beyond a possible sympathy deficit, the story may
focus legislators on some of the legal analytical problems that would come as part of such

and drafting of the proposed Healthy Workplace Bill. See, e.g., David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of
"Workplace Bullying" and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protections, 88
GEORGETOWN L.J. 475 (2000).
80
Bernstein, supra note __, at 1552.
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legislation—such as coverage (who is protected) and whether reverse discrimination
claims are permitted.
In the end, I adhere to my prediction that few appearance discrimination laws will
be enacted. Nonetheless, considering the prospects for enactment of an appearance
discrimination law helps us understand why some characteristics come to be protected by
law and others do not.
2. “Fitting” Appearance Claims Under Other Protected Characteristics
a. How the Courts Fit Claims Under Covered Characteristics
Because there is no federal, state, or local law prohibiting appearance-based
discrimination applicable to Ms. Lorenzana’s claim, how does she or her attorney think
she will recover? To recover under employment discrimination laws (other than in those
few places that have appearance laws), one must “fit” appearance-based discrimination
under another expressly protected characteristic. This is what Lorenzana has attempted,
characterizing her claim, in part,82 as sex discrimination and sexual harassment (hostile
environment) under New York City employment discrimination law. The key to a sex
discrimination claim is proving that a plaintiff was treated differently than a similarly
situated member of the other sex.83 In appearance cases, one viable theory is different
dress and grooming standards for male and female employees. This theory does not even
stretch sex discrimination because it is in fact different treatment of men and women.
Although different requirements for men and women obviously is discrimination based
on sex, courts have recognized that employers usually are not going to have the same
82

She also asserts a retaliation claim.
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift
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dress and grooming codes for men and women. Generally, different standards are
permitted as long as they do not impose unequal burdens on men and women.84 Alas,
this theory of appearance discrimination as sex discrimination does not seem applicable
to Lorenzana’s claim because she asserts that she was told to dress differently than other
employees, but her comparators are other women, not men. As her complaint states it,
“Plaintiff was advised that told [sic] that these other comparator females may wear what
they like, as they [sic] general unattractiveness rendered moot their sartorial choices,
unlike Plaintiff, whose shapeliness could not be heightened by beautifully tailored
clothing.”85 Such an allegation does not suggest that plaintiff will succeed; this is not the
stuff of disparate treatment of men and women.

There are, however, theories available for “fitting” appearance-based
discrimination under sex discrimination in which “because of . . . sex” is satisfied through
some forcing of appearance into sex. One might question whether this phenomenon of
fitting nonprotected characteristics under expressly protected characteristics is a healthy
approach to permitting some plaintiffs to recover rather than simply amending the laws to
expressly cover the characteristic, but more about that momentarily. Appearance claims
have been fit under statutorily protected characteristics in numerous cases. For example,
Abercrombie & Fitch, a clothing store chain emphasizing young people’s fashions, has
been sued for requiring that its sales associates have the “A&F Look.”86 While this is
appearance-based discrimination, it was brought under race because the A&F Look was
84
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characterized as young, white and preppie.87 Another lawsuit alleged that female hires at
A&F stores were restricted in number, thus brining the claims under sex.88 Abercrombie
settled three such lawsuits, including a lawsuit filed by the EEOC, for about $50
million.89 In an even more creative type of claim, an employee claimed that the type of
clothing that employees were required to wear violated her religious beliefs.90 Ms.
Lorenzana has couched her claim in terms of sex discrimination, but this is unlike some
of the claims against Abercrombie & Fitch and other cases in which a woman claims to
be disadvantaged because the appearance favored for employment or other positive
employment action is male. Essentially, Lorenzana is claiming that she was
discriminated against because she was a sexy-looking woman.
Another theory employed to fit various types of claims under sex discrimination is
gender or sex stereotyping. This theory is used most often to fit sexual orientation claims
under sex discrimination, and most commonly in sexual harassment cases. Gender
stereotyping traces its origins to the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.91 Essentially, this theory argues that a person is discriminated against on the
basis of sex because the victim does not fit the stereotype held by the discriminators of a
man or a woman or a man or woman in that type of job—that is, that the victim is not
manly or womanly enough, either in general or specifically in the job at issue.92 In Price
Waterhouse, for example, the plaintiff, an associate in a major accounting firm, was a
87
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woman who has denied partnership in part because she was too “abrasive” and “macho,”
a woman who would benefit from “tak[ing] a course at charm school.”93 The gender
stereotyping theory actually may work for Lorenzana’s claims. The argument could be
framed as she was too sexy to satisfy the stereotype her supervisors had for a woman in
her job. This theory would be strengthened (more clearly satisfy “because of sex”) if she
could prove that the male supervisors did not have any qualms about sexy or hot men in
the same or similar jobs.
Other than sex, are there other protected characteristics into which Lorenzana
might fit her claims? Probably not, but there is at least one interesting possibility.
Lorenzana mentioned that it is part of her Latin culture for a woman to spend time
making herself look very feminine for work.94 There are the seeds of a national origin
claim there. For example, plaintiffs have argued that a particular fashion was so closely
associated with a particular race or national origin group that to discriminate on the basis
of that fashion was the equivalent of discrimination based on race or national origin. 95
Although I think it would be difficult for her to prove that the look that she was told to
change was characteristically Latin, this is one approach to fitting appearance claims
under protected characteristics. I do not see how Lorenzana’s claims could be fit into any
other protected characteristics.96 Although it is not her case, it is easy to see how many
appearance claims could be fit under age. In a society that is obsessed and infatuated
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with youth, a certain look, such as the “A&F look,” may be a youthful look unattainable
by persons in the protected class over 40.97
Fitting is not limited to appearance claims. Consider, for example, claims for
sexual orientation discrimination, which is not yet covered by federal employment
discrimination law,98 although it is covered by the law of 21 states99 and many local
ordinances.100 Some plaintiffs have been able to fit claims of sexual orientation
discrimination or harassment under sex discrimination.101 Yet another example is claims
for discrimination based on caregiver or family responsibility status, which often are
couched in terms of sex, race, or disability (often relational) discrimination.102
b. Fitting—Courts Properly Patrolling the Fringes of
Employment Discrimination Law
Considering the phenomenon of fitting in the context of appearance-based claims
and claims for other characteristics, should this practice cause concern? Are employment
discrimination laws being stretched in unintended ways, and could this phenomenon
bring discredit on employment discrimination law? I think there is no great danger here,
97
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and I go further to argue that this is how employment discrimination law should
function—a core of protected characteristics with a penumbra of characteristics that can
be fit under them in appropriate cases.
In some cases, courts’ acceptance of theories of fit presages legislative action.
For example, gender stereotyping and other theories that have been used to fit sexual
orientation under sex are harbingers of the eventual passage of federal law prohibiting
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.103 On the other hand, courts are
able to control fit when they believe that it stretches too far the exiting law. For example,
a husband, wife and daughter who were fired by a company sued alleging, in part, that
terminating the three of them constituted sex discrimination.104 The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ claims, stating that familial status is not protected under Title VII.105
Thus, fitting affords courts some discretion in patrolling the fringes of
employment discrimination law. Enacting new employment discrimination laws is
difficult, contentious, and costly. The political battles, the controversy, and the potential
backlash involved in attempts to enact laws adding covered characteristics means that not
many new characteristics will be added, and it will not happen often. This is particularly
true in the global economy in which the argument is raised when new employment laws
are proposed that we will drive businesses out of the country by over-regulating.106
Fitting also provides courts a vehicle for reining in employers who are abusing the
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prerogative to terminate without reason afforded them by the employment at will
doctrine.107
B. Discriminating Against Hot People: The Challenges of Reverse Discrimination
Ms. Lorenzana’s claim illustrates a question that I previously raised about
appearance discrimination if it were covered: “Would there be reverse discrimination
claims for the appearance-gifted?”108 “Reverse discrimination” refers to discrimination
against a member of a group that historically has not been commonly discriminated
against, such as a race discrimination claim by a Caucasian.109 When we discuss the
unfairness of discrimination against people because of their physical appearance, we
seldom have in mind discrimination against “hot” or beautiful people. Yet, that is Ms.
Lorenzana’s claim, and it is plausible that some employers would prefer not to have
employees who are so attractive or so sexy that their appearance is the dominant
impression they make on coworkers and/or customers. Thus, her claim is a reminder of
the difficulties presented by reverse discrimination claims—difficulties that challenge the
very foundations of our employment discrimination law.
There is a cogent argument that reverse discrimination claims are merely
discrimination claims, and they should be treated no differently than traditional
discrimination claims. That argument posits that to treat them differently is in itself
discrimination and is violative of the equal treatment underpinnings of our employment
discrimination statutes and perhaps the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. On the other hand, there is an argument that Congress was not principally
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addressing problems of reverse discrimination when it passed employment discrimination
laws, and perhaps it did not intend to cover such discrimination at all. Thus, the first
question is whether a reverse discrimination claim is covered by a particular employment
discrimination law? The answer has varied depending upon the discrimination statute at
issue. The Supreme Court clearly has held that reverse discrimination claims are viable
under Title VII for race110 and sex,111 and it has been assumed by the courts that this
principle holds for all characteristics covered by Title VII.112 In contrast, in General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline the Court held that reverse age discrimination
claims are not actionable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).113
That result was not obvious, and there are good arguments in both the majority and
dissenting opinions in the 6-3 decision. Reverse discrimination claims are a debatable
issue under Title VII because everyone is covered by most of the protected
characteristics; that is everyone has a race, color, sex, and national origin, although
everyone may not have a religion. General Dynamics Land Systems debated the issue of
reverse claims because everyone 40 or older is protected by the ADEA; thus, in theory a
42-year old could be discriminated against based on her youth in favor of an older
employee. The Americans With Disabilities Act, in contrast, protects only qualified
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individuals with disabilities; thus there can be no reverse claims by the nondisabled .114
If physical appearance were a protected characteristic, would courts permit beautiful,
sexy, or attractive plaintiffs to recover for reverse discrimination, as in Ms. Lorenzana’s
case? The answer is not obvious, and existing discrimination law does not furnish a
definitive answer.
Second, after resolving that plaintiffs can bring most types of reverse
discrimination claims, some court have required plaintiffs in such cases to prove their
cases differently than plaintiffs in traditional discrimination cases. The most common
example is the requirement that a plaintiff go beyond the typical prima facie case by
proving “background circumstances” which establish that the subject employer is the
unusual type that engages in nontypical discrimination.115 This is a controversial
principle because, as noted above, it does not treat all persons equally, and thus seems to
violate a core principle of discrimination law.116 However, the usual assumptions on
which the analytical frameworks were based do not apply equally to reverse
discrimination cases.117
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Thus, reverse discrimination claims cause considerable difficulty in employment
discrimination law. Treating reverse discrimination claims differently than traditional
discrimination claims, although quite reasonable, at least in terms of the proof structures
under which they are analyzed, poses at least two dangers: 1) possible constitutional
infirmity under the fourteenth amendment;118 and 2) adverse reaction from judges and
perhaps ultimately the public who believe that discrimination law should not
discriminate. So, it is an intriguing question whether an employment discrimination law
prohibiting discrimination based on physical appearance would cover reverse
discrimination claims. Further, if reverse discrimination claims were recognized for
appearance, would plaintiffs be required to prove more in such cases, as with background
circumstances? While a strong case can be made that the appearance-challenged need
legal protection to prevent the disadvantages likely to be visited upon them because of
their relative unattractiveness, it is less likely that there is much sympathy for the
appearance-gifted needing protection from the disadvantages imposed on them because
of their beauty. In the context of Lorenzana’s suit, writers have conjured up the infamous
line from a 1980s shampoo commercial: “Don’t hate me because I’m beautiful.”119 The
reverse discrimination appearance claims likely would evoke about as much sympathy as
the pleas of the model in the shampoo commercial. The courts might reject such claims,
invoking the rationale of the Supreme Court in General Dynamics Land Systems that
when Congress used the term “age discrimination” it had in mind the meaning that most
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people have in common usage—discrimination against older people.120 However, there
undoubtedly are jobs for which employers do not hire very attractive people, and
probably almost always women, because the stereotype is that beautiful women may lack
intelligence or gravitas.121 Another likely type of discrimination against attractive
women is that they may be segregated to jobs or job duties that utilize their looks for
gain, regardless of what other abilities and skills they possess.
It is not clear whether reverse discrimination claims would be cognizable if
appearance were a covered characteristic, and if they were, whether the analysis of such
claims would differ from traditional appearance discrimination claims. Thinking about
the issue and considering the inconsistent answers we have arrived at for the currently
covered characteristics reveals the nuanced complexity and controversy of the
employment discrimination laws.
C. Would Hotness or Lack Thereof Be a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification?
Both Title VII and the ADEA include a statutory defense for discriminating on the
basis of protected characteristics if the characteristic constitutes a “bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business.”122
The “BFOQ” affirmative defense, although expressly provided for in Title VII, applies to
only sex, national origin, and religion-- not race and color. The BFOQ defense as
provided for in the statutory language and as developed in the case law recognizes that
there are narrow circumstances in which a covered characteristic actually may be relevant
and “reasonably necessary” to the job. The test developed by the courts to determine the
120
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applicability of the BFOQ defense is very difficult for a defendant to satisfy.123 The test
first identifies the essence of the business, as determined by the court, not the employer,
and then asks whether the essence of the business makes it essential for the employer to
discriminate on the basis of the protected characteristic.124
Some of the most significant cases in which defendants raised BFOQ defenses
involved claims of sex discrimination and appearance discrimination. Although the
claims against the employers have been for sex discrimination because they hired only
women for particular jobs, the employers actually were hiring women with a certain
appearance—attractive, sexy, and/or slim.
Although it is a district court decision, perhaps the most famous BFOQ case is
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.125 In Wilson, the fledgling Southwest Airlines hired
only women for the high customer contact positions of flight attendant and ticket agent.
Men who were denied those jobs sued for sex discrimination, and Southwest defended on
the ground of BFOQ. The argument deviated from the usual version of BFOQ (i.e., only
a woman could do the job) and instead took the form that Southwest’s clientele,
businessmen flying between major Texas cities, preferred the female image that was at
the heart of the airline’s “Love” market brand. The agency that developed the marketing
campaign described the desired female employee as follows:
This lady is young and vital ... she is charming and goes through life
with great flair and exuberance ... you notice first her exciting smile,
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friendly air, her wit ... yet she is quite efficient and approaches all her
tasks with care and attention. . . . 126
The court in Wilson rejected the BFOQ defense because under the two-part test,
Southwest could not satisfy the first part of the test. The essence of its business was
transporting passengers safely and quickly; the court rejected Southwest’s argument that
the essence of its business was to transport passengers with a certain panache—with love.
Having stripped the essence of what Southwest did to, well, its essence, the court
concluded that females did not uniquely possess the ability to perform the job duties of
ticket agent and flight attendant.127
Frank v. United Airlines is another airline case that involved the BFOQ
defense.128 The airline used weight tables based on body frames to set maximum body
weights for flight attendants. However, the maximum weight for males was based on
large body frames, and the maximum weight for females was based on medium body
frames. Consequently, only females who were substantially lighter than males qualified
for jobs. The airline defended, in part, under BFOQ,129 arguing that overweight flight
attendants could not perform some of the functions, such as providing physical assistance
in emergencies. The court found that the airline failed to satisfy the BFOQ test.
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Finally, in a famous case that never went to trial, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission filed an action against Hooters restaurants for the company’s
refusal to hire men as servers, instead restricting the position of “Hooters Girls” to
females.130 Hooters staked out a legal argument that being female was a BFOQ for being
a Hooters girl.131 The EEOC had the better of the argument based on precedent, but
Hooters embarked on an aggressive public relations campaign apparently intended to
make the EEOC’s position look foolish. Eventually Hooters reached a settlement with
the EEOC, but the settlement permitted Hooters to continue its hiring practice.132
The BFOQ cases discussed above and many others demonstrate the importance of
appearance to many employers in many jobs. Although Southwest, United Airlines, and
Hooters were sued for hiring exclusively women for particular jobs, it was not just
women that they were hiring, but attractive and/or slim and/or sexy women whom the
employers believed would satisfy their customers’ preference. Abercrombie and Fitch
also has been sued for hiring only sales associates that have the “A&F look,” but those
suits were couched in terms of race, to which BFOQ does not apply.133
If appearance were a protected characteristic, would BFOQ be a recognized
defense? The problem is precisely the one identified by the court in Wilson: if we let
employers argue that they make more money when customers are drawn to their
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attractive employees, the heretofore narrow BFOQ defense would be greatly expanded.134
Indeed, our experience with the BFOQ cases under existing law may suggest a reason
why physical appearance is not, and never will be, a characteristic generally covered by
employment discrimination laws. Not only do people routinely discriminate based on
appearance, many employers do it as a matter of policy or practice. Some employers
may simply prefer as a matter of personal taste to hire attractive women, but many
believe that their business will enjoy higher profits as a result of such hires. An extreme
version of the higher profits rationale is that some businesses actually build attractive or
sexy women, and perhaps fewer such men, into their business identity. Thus, Southwest
Airlines argued that the women in certain jobs were part of the essence of the business.
Although the court rejected that argument as a matter or law, it was true as a matter of
fact. Hooters and Abercrombie and Fitch seem to have arguments at least as strong as a
factual matter: although they sell food and clothing, respectively, what they market is
sexy, young people, often marketed to sexy, young people.135
The BFOQ defense rarely has been successful when the argument has been
customer preference136 or profits,137 but the inclination to prohibit employers from
discriminating based on appearance has seemed weak. Consider, for example, that
Hooters’ aggressive public relations campaign, including appeals to legislators, caused
the EEOC to drop the suit. In the Wilson case, the court, although it held that Southwest
134
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Airlines could not satisfy the BFOQ defense, closed the opinion with the following
passage, which suggests the court’s discomfort with the litigation and the result:
One final observation is called for. This case has serious underpinnings,
but it also has disquieting strains. These strains, and they were only that,
warn that in our quest for non-racist, non-sexist goals, the demand for
equal rights can be pushed to silly extremes. The rule of law in this
country is so firmly embedded in our ethical regimen that little can stand
up to its force except literalistic insistence upon one's rights. And such
inability to absorb the minor indignities suffered daily by us all without
running to court may stop it dead in its tracks. We do not have such a case
here only warning signs rumbling from the facts.138
Thus, we see that appearance discrimination is a pervasive practice of employers,
it usually is a matter of customer preference and business marketing, and if BFOQ were
recognized as a defense, it would be asserted often by employers.

Those same

considerations were influential in Congress not including a race or color BFOQ in Title
VII.139 In the end, however, my guess is that BFOQ would be recognized as a defense to
appearance discrimination, primarily because we, and Congress, do not have the same
moral revulsion toward appearance discrimination that we have about race
discrimination.
If appearance were a protected characteristic and BFOQ were a recognized
defense to appearance-based discrimination, it is clear that employers would be able to
argue for some jobs that attractiveness or sexiness or slimness was a BFOQ. However,
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consider the opposite issue raised by Ms. Lorenzana’s claim: would employers be able
to argue successfully that for some jobs unattractiveness, lack of sexiness, or nonslimness
was a BFOQ? Of course this would be an issue only if reverse appearance discrimination
claims were recognized.140 If the law followed Title VII law on sex as a BFOQ, the
defense would work both ways. But would legislatures and courts think that employers
need or should have a BFOQ to defend discriminating against beautiful people in favor of
ugly people?
Might some employers in fact not hire very beautiful or sexy people for some
jobs? Ms. Lorenzana claims that her supervisors told her that she distracted her male
colleagues from their jobs. It is not hard to imagine a case in which an employer would
think that a stunningly attractive or sexy woman would not be taken seriously in a
particular job.141 This concept relates to the theory of sex or gender stereotyping which
posits that people discriminate against a man or woman in a job who does not fit the
discriminator’s stereotype of what a man or woman in that job should be like.142 Finally,
some employers might avoid hiring very attractive or sexy women (or perhaps men)
based on fear that their other employees would be inclined to sexually harass the
beautiful person, with the employer being required to address the harassment and perhaps
to incur liability. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that some employers might
discriminate against the appearance-gifted. Would they be afforded the BFOQ defense?
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This discussion of BFOQ should elucidate much about employment
discrimination law. The law of BFOQ indicates the difficulty posed by, on the one hand,
prohibiting discrimination based on a particular characteristic but, on the other, admitting
that the characteristic in some cases will be so relevant to a job that employers ought to
be able to take it into account. The balance between prohibiting discrimination and
accommodating employers’ interest is hard to strike. It is made more difficult because
the test developed to evaluate BFOQ strikes at the heart of employer autonomy and
prerogative, as courts define the essence of a business and often reject employers’
conceptions of their essence. The omission of race and color from the Title VII BFOQ
shows that when Congress is very serious about a type of discrimination, it will not even
try to accommodate employers’ interest. Finally, appearance has been a dominant theme
in BFOQ cases because employers frequently discriminate based on appearance and then
argue the common sense relevance of appearance to jobs.
D. Retaliation: The Most Potent/ Dangerous Claim
Even if appearance never becomes a protected characteristic, there still is some
refuge for victims of such discrimination under the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII,
the ADEA, and the ADA.143 The antiretaliation clauses declare it to be an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate against an employee for opposing discriminatory
practices under the statute or for participating in investigations, proceedings, or hearings
under the statute. Employers should fear retaliation claims more than any other
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discrimination claims144 for at least two reasons: 1) a claimant can win a retaliation claim
even if she loses the predicate discrimination claim145; and 2) the elements of proof for a
retaliation claim are the most easily satisfied of all discrimination claims.146 Claimants
often make a prima facie showing on causation merely by establishing temporal
proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.147 The
Supreme Court in 2006 adopted a plaintiff-friendly definition of the adverse employment
action element in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White, holding that a
claimant establishes an adverse employment action if the action taken by the employer
“might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’”148 Retaliation claims have been on the rise in recent years,149 and
plaintiffs have enjoyed considerable success on such claims.150
Retaliation claims are important to appearance-based discrimination because, if as
I predict, federal and most state employment discrimination laws are not amended to
cover that characteristic, the existing antiretaliation provisions of Title VII, the ADEA,
and the ADA offer an avenue of recovery. Plaintiffs often assert their appearance claims
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by “fitting” them under Title VII or the ADEA.151 It is not necessary that the plaintiff
prevail on such a claim in order to have a successful retaliation claim. However, it is
necessary for the claimant to establish a reasonable and good faith belief that the
employer’s action is a violation of Title VII or the ADEA.152 Ms. Lorenzana asserts a
retaliation claim in her complaint,153 and it seems the most promising basis for recovery.
If a plaintiff can make a claim that an employer discriminates on the basis of appearance
and tie that to a characteristic covered by Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA, report that
conduct internally and then suffer adverse action, the prospect for a successful retaliation
claim does not look bad at all. Of course, a claim of appearance-based discrimination
that was not linked to a protected characteristic would not set up a viable retaliation
claim.
The range of protection afforded by anti-retaliation law is demonstrated not just
by the retaliation claim Lorenzana asserted in her complaint, but also by the retaliation
claim that her first attorney threatened to file against her current employer, JPMorgan
Chase. She says her current employer warned her to stop speaking out in the media about
her claims against Citibank, saying that she was violating an employee code of conduct
that prohibits employees from doing things that damage the reputation of the financial
industry.154 Her first attorney threatened that if she were fired or disciplined, his client
would sue JPMorgan. It seems clear that her conduct would come under the opposition
clause. As mentioned above, one must have a reasonable and good faith belief that the
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action one is opposing is illegal under the relevant employment discrimination law.155 It
seems clear that Lorenzana was speaking out against what she believed to be
discriminatory conduct.
There is a second limit on conduct that is protected by the antiretaliation
provisions: opposition conduct that is unlawful loses protection, and it is possible that
extremely disloyal conduct also loses protection.156 Would Lorenzana’s high-profile
approach of taking her case to the media and perhaps violating a code of conduct of her
current employer cause her otherwise protected activity to lose protection? Probably not,
but the facts present interesting issues. Many employees think that they have First
Amendment rights of free speech and expression in the workplace, which they do not
have because they work for private employers which, unlike governmental employers,
generally are not subject to the limitations imposed by the First Amendment.157 Even
with employees of private employers, however, there are some federal laws that provide
protection to some forms of employee speech and expression, such as the National Labor
Relations Act158 and antiretaliation provisions of the employment discrimination laws.
With both the NLRA and the antiretaliation provisions, however, the courts are mindful
of employers’ reasonable expectation of loyalty and their right to maintain discipline in
the workplace. Codes of conduct, such as the one apparently maintained by JPChase
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have become a fairly common way for employers to state their expectations regarding
employee conduct and loyalty. Still such codes of conduct may, as written or as applied,
infringe on statutory rights of employees.
The retaliation claim that Lorenzana asserted in her complaint and the one that her
lawyer threatened are reminders that the antiretaliation provisions in existing employment
discrimination laws expand coverage beyond the expressly covered characteristics.
Moreover, retaliation claims are the most potent and feared discrimination claims, and
they are being used by plaintiffs more often than ever before.
E. The Admissibility and Significance of Evidence of Appearance and Peripheral
Conduct in Employment Discrimination Cases
Ms. Lorenzana’s chances of success on her claim may be affected by her
appearance and some of her nonwork-related conduct. As mentioned above, some
criticism in the media has been directed at her for the photographs made available with
the lawsuit and story, but even more came when the 2003 video about her second breast
augmentation surfaced.159 A number of Ms. Lorenzana’s statements in the video
provoked writers to question whether she was a victim of discrimination or a person
seeking attention (and perhaps fortune).160 Yet, if the allegations of her complaint are
correct, is what she said in a video in 2003 relevant to her claims? Should such evidence
even be admissible in a trial or arbitration? A frequent issue in sexual harassment cases
is whether evidence of the alleged victim’s appearance and/or nonwork conduct is
admissible, and if it is what effect it has on the case.
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The issue of the plaintiff’s appearance and conduct arose in the Supreme Court’s
first major decision regarding sexual harassment. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, the defendant argued that the plaintiff, who was sexually harassed by her
supervisor, wore provocative clothes and had sexual fantasies.161 The Court concluded
that such evidence is “obviously relevant” and that there was no per se rule against its
admissibility; rather, the Court remanded to the district court with instructions that it
weigh “the applicable considerations” in deciding whether the evidence was
admissible.162 The Court’s point was that the evidence is relevant to one element of the
prima facie case for hostile environment sexual harassment: whether the harassment is
welcome. After the Meritor case, Congress enacted a rule of evidence that renders
evidence of the alleged victim’s other sexual behavior or sexual predisposition generally
inadmissible.163 The rule provides an exception and renders such evidence admissible if
“its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of
unfair prejudice to any party.”164 Even if the party seeking to have such evidence
admitted satisfies the standard, the rule provides specific procedures that must be
followed to have the evidence admitted.165
A case somewhat analogous to Ms. Lorenzana’s case is Burns v. McGregor Elec.
Industries.166 In that case, which predated the 1994 amendment of Federal Rule of
Evidence Rule 412, the district court had held that a woman who was a victim of sexual
harassment could not recover because she would not have been offended by the conduct,
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although a reasonable woman would have been. The district court reached that
conclusion based on the fact that the plaintiff had posed nude for some magazines outside
of the workplace and having no connection to her work.167 The court of appeal reversed,
stating as follows:
The plaintiff's choice to pose for a nude magazine outside work hours
is not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her employer's workrelated conduct offensive. This is not a case where Burns posed in
provocative and suggestive ways at work. Her private life, regardless how
reprehensible the trier of fact might find it to be, did not provide lawful
acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her work place by her
employer. To hold otherwise would be contrary to Title VII's goal of
ridding the work place of any kind of unwelcome sexual harassment.168
Thus, the general rule has developed that in sexual harassment cases, evidence
regarding sexual activity and predisposition, including dress, is not generally admissible.
Would evidence of the 2003 video be admissible in Lorenzana’s case? It is difficult to
predict, first because she stated her claims under the New York City employment
discrimination law. The analogous state evidence rule169 appears to apply to criminal
cases only, unlike Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 412, which applies to criminal and civil
cases. However, if a court applied a balancing test, like that under the federal rule,
between the probative value of the evidence and the unfair prejudice that would result, I
think different courts would strike that balance differently. Even if the evidence were
admitted, would it have much impact on whether the plaintiff established her claims?
167
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Although there is a good argument that even if the evidence were admitted, it should not
have much effect on the plaintiff’s claims, as in the Burns case,170 it is not farfetched to
suggest that a jury or a judge may not look sympathetically upon a plaintiff suing for sex
(and appearance) discrimination if shown a video in which she says she wants to look
like “a Playboy playmate.”
Issues regarding evidence of peripheral conduct are not limited to sexual
harassment cases. In a religious discrimination case, an employee charged that
Abercrombie and Fitch required her to wear clothes at work that were “sexy, form-fitting,
and designed to show off body contours and draw attention to the wearer.”171 The
employee objected to the dress requirement, explaining that because of her religious
beliefs, she must wear skirts that came below her knee and shirts with sleeves that came
below her forearm. Discussions regarding a possible accommodation of her religious
beliefs proved unavailing, and the employee resigned. The EEOC filed a lawsuit based
on the charge. The court denied a motion for partial summary judgment by the EEOC
because there was a genuine issue regarding whether the plaintiff sincerely held the
asserted religious belief. The genuine issue was created by the employee’s wearing a
formfitting skirt to her deposition in the case.172 The court explained that the former
employee’s dress at her deposition was “potentially inconsistent with her alleged
faith.”173
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Thus, contemplating appearance discrimination serves as a reminder that the issue
of admissibility and relevance of appearance and other-conduct evidence is a common
and controversial issue under existing discrimination law.
F. Why are Hot People and Ugly People Employees at Will?
Appearance-based discrimination and Lorenzana’s claim also provide a reminder
of the most important principle in U.S. employment law, employment at will, and how it
interacts with employment discrimination laws. Professor Rhode notes that only one
jurisdiction in another nation (the Australian state of Victoria) has appearance
discrimination law.174 However, if the facts alleged by Ms. Lorenzana are correct, she
would have a cognizable claim in most nations, not under their employment
discrimination laws, but under their general termination laws. Most nations have laws
that require employers to have a job- or business-related reason to terminate an employee.
The U.S. is a maverick,175 with forty-nine of fifty states clinging to employment at will,
pursuant to which employers may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no
reason at all.176 Thus, if Ms. Lorenzana was fired for her appearance or for complaining
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about how her supervisors treated her, she would have a claim for dismissal without good
cause in most nations and in the state of Montana, unless the employer could demonstrate
that appearance was related to job performance.177 In 49 U.S. states, however, the
employer does not have to offer good cause for termination unless the employee claims
that the reason for termination constitutes a breach of contract, constitutes a tort, or
violates a statute. Federal, state, and local employment discrimination statutes are by far
the most significant restriction in the U.S. on employment at will.
Employment at will is relevant to appearance discrimination in another way. One
argument made against passing a federal law prohibiting appearance discrimination is the
anticipated backlash from businesses.178 It is true that businesses generally prefer not to
have additional characteristics covered by employment discrimination laws, and that is
because they prefer to operate without regulation or with as little as possible. On the
matter of termination of employment, employment at will is the ultimate expression of
the absence of regulation. However, employment at will provides employers far less
freedom to fire than appears at first blush. There are numerous exceptions to
employment at will, including numerous federal and state statutes, tort theories including
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and contract theories. Thus, when an
177
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employee is fired, the question is whether the employee can fit her termination into one
of these exceptions. However, employment at will is vastly overrated in its value to
employers. With the existing employment discrimination statues and other exceptions to
employment at will, there are few situations in which employers would terminate an
employee and believe that they could rely on not giving a good reason for the termination
in litigation.179
It probably is true that most people in the United States think that it is unfair to
terminate an employee based on her physical appearance, yet our most important
employment law principle permits such a termination. Why? Employment at will is
greatly valued by employers and we preserve it. Nonetheless, we recognize numerous
exceptions, and employers must exercise caution and not act as though they have
unfettered employment at will because they may lose cases that squarely fit within
exceptions, and they may lose cases that can be made to fit within exceptions.
Some of the media reports about the Lorenzana case and other appearance
discrimination cases may cause people to misunderstand the current state of the law.
There is some evidence that most people do not understand the meaning of employment
at will—that workers can be fired for any reason.180 People who hear stories about
employers being sued for appearance-based discrimination may understand, regardless of
the accuracy of the reporting, that our current law prohibits this type of discrimination.
The story actually provides a good opportunity to explain that in most countries, a person
179
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fired based on her appearance would have a claim, but it would be under the for-cause
termination laws, not the discrimination laws.
Some claim that our discrimination laws are becoming too bloated, covering too
many characteristics.181 This argument may miss an important point: if we had a justcause termination law, there may not be as much clamoring for expansion of coverage
under the employment discrimination laws. The answer to Lorenzana’s claim and
Professor Rhode’s call for expansion of discrimination laws may be that we should
consider another option—modification of employment at will.182 The relationship and
balance between employment at will and employment discrimination law is at least worth
considering.
CONCLUSION
Appearance discrimination unquestionably is the hot employment law topic of the
summer. Debrahlee Lorenzana’s claims against Citibank for hotness discrimination and
Professor Rhode’s book about beauty bias have converged to bring the issue to the
attention of the public and the legal profession. Ironically, appearance-based
discrimination is not covered by federal employment discrimination laws or by many
state or local laws. Perhaps someday commentators will write about the law developing
under the Appearance Nondiscrimination Act of 2015. However, I predict that will not
come to pass. Yet, appearance discrimination is a very real and common form of
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discrimination in employment and other areas of life, and it provides a most effective
mirror for reflecting on many of the intriguing and controversial issues in our current
employment discrimination law. Even if appearance discrimination law never is enacted,
more discussion and understanding of the existing discrimination laws and perhaps
resulting opportunities to improve them would not be a bad legacy for the hot summer of
2010.
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